was a genuine and real man, and that his divine nature was also full and authentic and in no way compromised his human nature.

Ignatius' view of Christ's mission was closer to the view of the Fourth Gospel than to Paul's ideas. He described Christ as the Logos of the Father, whose mission was to establish everlasting life for the faithful through the abolition of death in the crucifixion and resurrection but especially by his presence in the believer. A Christian, for Ignatius, was literally, though mystically, the "temple of God" and a "God-bearer." Thus the individual Christian and the fellowship of the Church, being a community of "God-bearers," were literally extensions of the incarnation, and therefore, to Ignatius, its leaders, the presbyters and bishops, held the place and authority of Christ himself. Ignatius believed the Eucharist to be, in the full sense of the mystery, "the flesh of our savior," and the "medicine of immortality."

The intimacy of faith and works in Pauline teaching was generally obscured, and there was a tendency to separate them and to make works (moral living) an essential condition to salvation--a sort of second step--along with faith. It should be remembered that at this time there was no set of writings or doctrines formally recognized as official and definitive.

The most influential of Greek Christian Apologists was Justin, who has been referred to as the father of Christian theology. Justin believed that the truths which were fully revealed in the Logos in the person of Christ were foreshadowed in all human beings and especially in religious philosophies. Thus, to Justin, the non-Christian who understood the truth of the Logos in philosophy could be saved by the Logos even though such a person was thought to be an atheist. Thus the emphasis of the Greek Apologists came naturally to be on the teachings of Jesus rather than on his mystic redemptive function. In true philosophic vein, Justin also held that the Logos was not co-eternal with God but created by God as his own rational agency in creation, and thus while of divine nature, still subordinate to God rather than equal. But Justine was also trinitarian; that is, he believed that there were three persons in one God, but how this could be, he never made clear.

Regarding human nature, Justin and the other Greek Apologists held that God had created people free to decide for or against God and the righteous life, and that this freedom remained after the fall into sin. Thus a person could become a Christian by reading the prophets and the Gospels and by participating in the Lord's Supper, both of which they held to be essential to salvation. They believed Christ to be present in the elements of the sacrament, but they did not say how.

Somewhat related to the Greek Apologists and their commitment to rational philosophy as the work of the Logos were the Gnostics, who were, however, rejected as heretics. What made the difference between the Apologists and the Gnostics was that along with the philosophical interest, the Gnostics developed their own mystery cult in which they claimed special secret or intuitive knowledge (*gnosis*, hece Gnostics) of divine truth, and in which they joined the Docetists (those who held that the

human body and nature of Jesus were an appearance only and not real). Some of them became involved in magic and astrology, and because of their belief in the freedom of the will and salvation by faith and grace alone, led libertarian, profligate lives.

Central to their doctrines was the question of how an imperfect world could proceed from a perfect God. To avoid this difficulty, they taught that there were two worlds in sharp contrast to each other--a world of good and a world of evil, of light and darkness, of spirit and matter. Matter was believed to be evil and hence could not be derived from the being of God. God was to be distinguished, therefore, from the creator of the world and the giver of the law of the Old Testament. The world, they held, actually came into being by a process of emanations from the divine Being according to the law of opposites or polarities--spirit and matter, good and evil, etc. The results of these emanations were called Aeons, which were thought to be the media of creation. The weakest and the lowest of these Aeons was called the Demiurge and was the creator of the world. The highest of the Aeons was the redemmer incarnate in Jesus, but quite distinct from the human person.

The function of Christ, then, was not to atone in his death for the sins of the world nor to provide the mystic sacrament of union with God, but to free the spiritual element from the material body by giving to people in the mystical rites the saving knowledge that made the resurrection of the body superfluous.

The presence and threat of the heresies of Docetism and Gnosticism had the effect of forcing the Church to take a clearer and more specific stand on what amounted to the orthodox, official view, and to establish an official list of scriptures. The criteria which were used to establish the official list, or canon, were contained in two questions: (1) Were the authors Apostles or acquaintances of Apostles? (2) If not, did the content agree with Apostolic teachings? This had the added value of providing a sound basis for deciding for or against any teachings whatsoever.

On this basis the official list of scriptures included all of our New Testament except Hebrews, I John, I and II Peter, and James. On this basis also the Church, in the persons of Tertullian, Hippolytus, and especially Irenaeus, was able to take a definite stand against the Docetists and the Gnostics. Its position may be summarized as follows:

1. God is at once the creator, preserver, and redeemer, and there is no separation of these powers into discreet beings.

2. Sin is to be explained by the free act of a person's will and not by a dualism of matter and spirit in which matter is evil; otherwise, the human responsibility for sin cannot be maintained.

3. The incarnation of the Logos is full and genuine without compromising the humanity of Jesus.

4. There is to be a genuine resurrection of the body and not

simply an immortality of the soul, a separating of the spirit from the body.

Along with the establishment of the canon and the rejection of the Gnostic heresies by the work of men like Irenaeus and by the general consensus of the Church, there was a strengthening of the view that the writings were divinely inspired and therefore infallible, though there was some disagreement as to just how the inspiration took place to guarantee infallibility. Some held that the state of inspiration in the writer of the scriptures was an ecstacy in which the human element was totally subordinated, while others allowed for the human agency but without compromising the divine origin or the inerrancy of the writing.

Alexandrian and Roman Theology (c. A.D. 160-230)

The third century A.D. was dominated by two classic figures, Origen (c. 185-254) in the East at Alexandria and Tertullian (164-230) in the West at Rome. For the sake of brevity and comprehensiveness, we will simply list the teachings of Origen. In his work *On First Principles*, he set forward the following views:

1. God is an incomprehensible and unchangeable spiritual being.

2. God is both just and good, since one without the other is not possible.

3. God and the world are co-eternal, but God eternally causes the world, and it is not an emanation nor a polar reality.

4. God is person.

5. Logos is the agent of all divine activity and mediator between God and the human race.

6. The Logos as Son of God is eternally generated by God and is eternally an aspect of divine being and activity; therefore, he is *homoousias* ("the same essence") just as the will of a person proceeds from the mind and yet is an aspect of the mind, two things yet of one being.

7. God is above the Son and the Son subordinate to the Father, because the Son is an aspect of the Father, a generation of the Father.

8. The Holy Spirit was the first generation of the Logos, and its action is limited to the souls of the Saints while the Logos is active in all rational beings.

9. The Logos created individual souls whose nature is characterized by freedom of will, and by the freedom of the will people proceed toward the imitation of God or toward degeneration.

10. The world and human bodies were created as a school of discipline and purification of the soul to restore it to its original purity.

11. Human beings, therefore, are neither predetermined by God nor by inherited "original" sin.

12. The incarnation of the Logos, the teachings and example of Jesus, and the sacraments are all calculated to encourage people to renounce sin and achieve spiritual freedom from the body, its appetites and passions.

13. The death of Christ was not only a sacrifice for sin offered to God on behalf of all human beings, but importantly a ransom paid to the devil into whose domain human beings had sold themselves by the exercise of their free will in their sin.

14. All souls, including Satan, are finally restored to live in the divine presence.

Tertullian (c. 160-230) in the West gave a more realistic, more concrete tone to theology than did the Platonic, mystic idealism and metaphysical speculation of the East (Origen). He rejected the dualism of Origen with its belief that the soul is "fallen" in the body and taught rather that people are at once both soul and body, that soul is transmitted from parent to child in conception. This supported the doctrine of original, inherited sin, and yet, said Tertullian, there always remains in the soul a portion which is good. What is derived from God as original goodness was said to be "obscured" rather than "extinguished." He agreed with Origen that people still possess freedom of will. He held to the inspiration of the scriptures, but because they could be perverted by heretics, he asserted the authority of tradition in interpreting them. Contrary to Origen, he held that the Logos (Son) had a beginning and is a being distinct from the Father and that the Holy Spirit is distinct from both. The three are, he insisted, one substance but three persons, and they are the same substance because the Son and the Holy Spirit are derived from God. The Logos was incarnate in the body of Jesus, who also had a human soul, but the divine Logos is not capable of suffering; it was only the human body and soul of Jesus that suffered on the cross. Tertullian also held that baptism is essential to salvation, but that the Eucharist is symbolic.

It is obvious that the central problem of Christian theology was a two-edged one. It involved the questions of the unity or plurality of the being of God and the unity or plurality of the nature of Christ.

With regard to the unity or plurality of God, there were two extreme views. One held that Jesus was a man of high piety and spiritual sensitivity,but not literally God incarnate nor even the Logos incarnate, who had received at the baptism a special power from the Holy Spirit. Paul, Patriarch of Samosata from 260 to 272, believed also that the Son (Logos) and the Holy Spirit were impersonal attributes of God and could, therefore, never become incarnate. Thus the "monarchy" (unity) of God was

maintained by making the Son and the Holy Spirit dynamic aspects of God. The other view was that Christ was truly divine in the full, radical sense that God was actually born in human flesh and suffered on the cross (known as *patri-passianism*, "the suffering of the Father"). Thus the terminology of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were terms for the different modes of God and not for different persons or different attributes of God.

The Eastern Church condemned the former heresy, insisting on a genuine unity of genuine persons; the Western Church condemned the latter view, insisting on the distinction of the personalities of the Father and the Son. Thus both were trying at the same time to maintain the doctrine of the unity, or oneness, of God.

The Arian Controversy

Such conflicts led to the famous Arian controversy and the Council of Nicaea in A.D. 325. Arius (d. A.D. 336) was an Eastern (Alexandrian) theologian who agreed with the orthodox belief that Christ was indeed the Logos of God, but he denied that the Logos shared God's nature. He was not eternal but was created by God at a moment in time and later became incarnate in Jesus and took the place of the rational human spirit. Thus Christ as incarnate Logos was neither truly human, because he lacked the true human soul, nor truly God, because he lacked the fullness of the essence and attributes of God. Arius further held that if the Logos were distinct and eternal in any mode of being at all, then there would be two gods and not one. The issue was formally resolved against Arius in the Council of Nicaea by the establishment of the dogma that the Son and the Father were of one substance (*homoousian*). But the battle between the Arians and the anti-Arians waged hot and heavy through many councils and wavering fortunes. Twice the Homoousians, victorious at Nicaea, were condemned and banished--at Arles in 353 and at Milan in 355--but the Nicaean position was finally sustained in 381 at the Council of Constantinople.

But this did not completely lay the issue to rest. Arius, as mentioned earlier, and later an anti-Arian, Apollinaris (d. c. 392), had held that Christ assumed a human body while the Logos took the place of the human rational principle, so that Christ was neither truly human nor truly divine. The tendency to emphasize either the divine or the human nature in resolving the problem revolved around the two Eastern schools, one at Alexandria in Egypt and the other at Antioch in Asia Minor. Both held to the unity of the two natures, but Alexandria stressed the divinity while Antioch stressed the humanity. In the Alexandrian view, the human became divine as a grain of vinegar (human) is absorbed in the ocean (divine). In the Antiochian view, the human and the divine are separate; they are asoociated but not completely united. Thus in the Alexandrian view, it was proper to say that God became man and was crucified, while in the Antiochian view, God and man are united only in the will of Christ. It was a moral union of two natures in one person. This they held to be necessary because what was true of human beings in general

must be true of a human being in particular; therefore, Jesus, as a particular human being, possessed as one of his essential attributes free will, but this will, being free, could not be wholly merged with and identical with the will of God.

The conflict was focused in Cyril of Alexandria and in Nestorius, Bishop of Constantinople. Cyril accused Nestorius of saying that people were redeemed by a human being and worshipped a human being; Nestorius accused Cyril of annulling the immutable oneness of God. They convened two separate councils (because one party did not wait for the other to arrive) at Ephesus in 431, and each condemned the other, and thus settled nothing, although it seemed that the Alexandrians were favored as being in accord with the Apostolic view and the Nicene Creed.

The struggle continued until the Council of Chalcedon near Constantinople in 451, which affirmed the doctrine of the union of the two natures--"unmingled, immutable, indivisible, inseparable . . . the peculiarity of each nature being preserved." Thus the Church finally and permanently established for many centuries to come the doctrine of the true and full union of God the Son and man.

PHILOSOPHY: EPICUREANISM, STOICISM, AND NEO-PLATONISM

While the empire of the Greeks yielded slowly to the Romans, the culture of Rome, while retaining its own genius, adopted much of the Greek culture. This was as true in religion and philosophy as it was in art and literature.

We shall say nothing in particular about the Roman religion here, with its belief in such gods as Jupiter and Juno and the rest, because there was nothing new in the kind of religion that was involved. It was the same kind of religion that we have seen in the Homeric religion of Greece; as a matter of fact, much of the Roman religion was borrowed from the Greeks. In the sixth century B.C. a collection of oracles called *The Sibylline Books* was introduced into Rome, and from these books many adoptions from Greek religion into Roman religion were made. Many of the Roman gods were nothing other than the Greek gods with Roman names. Jupiter was none other than the Greek Zeus, and so on. The mystery religions of the Hellenistic empire were absorbed also, but we have treated these elsewhere. We shall confine ourselves here to the leading philosophical views of the Romans between 300 B.C. and A.D. 400.

In Greek philosophy--in Plato, Aristotle, and the atomists--were established the great fountainheads of Western philosophy. The atomism of the Greeks became submerged for many centuries, being revived only in modern times in empirical science. From the time of Aristotle, therefore, Plato and Aristotle were the two great fountainheads of philosophy. The chief advocate of Platonism was Plotinus in the third century A.D. (204-270), and the chief advocates of Aristotelianism, which we shall examine

first, were found in the schools of Epicureanism and Stoicism.

Epicureanism

Epicurus was born in 341 B.C. on the island of Samos and settled in Athens in 306 B.C. He died in 270 B.C. He was not much interested in physics and metaphysics but found the atomic materialism of Democritus and other atomists congenial to his chief interest in ethics.

Epicurus is known as an egocentric or psychological hedonist--hedonist because he believed that pleasure was *the* good for human beings, and egocentric or psychological because he believed pleasure was a private matter and not a social one, and because he conceived of "pleasure" as "pleasure" and did not confuse it with other things from which pleasure might flow. It is one thing, for example, to say that doing the will of God is the good for human beings and quite another to say that the pleasure which flows for an individual person from doing the will of God is the good for that person. It was the latter that Epicurus and all other hedonists meant, and we must not lose sight of this. Thus he held that the criteria of all value for human beings are pleasure and pain. What is pleasurable is good, and what is painful is bad. That this is so cannot and need not be argued, he said; it is self-evident.

But Epicurus also argued, contrary to some hedonists, that we must use our intelligence to distinguish between pleasures that are beneficial and those that are harmful in the long run. The reasonable person will deny himself present pleasure which produces more pain in the long run and may even accept some present pain if it produces more pleasure in the long run.

This seems reasonable enough and hardly worth making a point of, but the atomist Aristippus (c. 435-356 B.C.) had held that because all motions of atoms are what they are by mechanistic causal necessity, and because all psychological states (feelings, thoughts, etc.) are, therefore only experiences of those motions, it then followed that every feeling is of necessity just what it is and cannot be anything other than what it is. Thus there is no possibility of any pleasure or pain being in error or "wrong." Hence, he held that "what feels good is good" because it feels good, and thus it is right for each person to enjoy each and every pleasure as it occurs, no matter how unseemly it may appear. One would, of course, avoid the pain of social disapproval, but only if the pain of it outweighs the pleasure involved. Just how one "avoided" anything in such a system has always remained a mystery. Thus it was to some point that Epicurus insisted that we must make distinctions. There remained, however, only the choice between pleasures and not between pleasure and something else, such as duty, for example.

A further, more significant difference existed between men like Aristippus and Epicurus. Aristippus held to a very positive view of pleasure, the satisfaction of all appetite and desire, while Epicurus held to a distinction between natural pleasures and vain ones, and of the natural ones that some are necessary and others merely natural but not necessary.

The prudent person, he said, will rightly distinguish between these by the two criteria of freedom from pain in the body and freedom from trouble in the mind. This constitutes a sort of negativism. It involves indulging in pleasures for the body only insofar as they remove natural pain, e.g., eating or drinking simply to remove the pain of hunger and thirst. Overindulgence in food and drink beyond natural needs and merely because they taste good is unnatural and evil.

The chief "trouble" for the mind, Epicurus noted, is fear of God, fear that he will punish us after death. But we need not fear, he said, because, first, there is no afterlife; a person is nothing but a concourse of atoms, and the "soul" is only a function of the unity of the atoms in an organism, so that at death when the body disintegrates, the soul ceases to exist and cannot suffer. In any case, he said, God, being wholly beneficent and benevolent--perfectly happy and of perfect good will--will not punish people for enjoying life. Thus to rid the soul of fear of God will leave it free from its chief trouble.

Next to fear of God in the troubles of the mind are the pains which come from the ambitions and anxieties of public life where people seek honors and power. The cure for this, he said, is to avoid public life as not natural or necessary for tranquillity.

The desirable state of human beings, then, is not constant pleasure but *ataraxia* ("tranquillity"), absence of pain in the body and freedom from fear in the mind. This state is achieved by the life of prudence, which dictates simplicity and frugality. Cheese and crackers and water satisfy our natural need for food, and such a diet is frugal and simple. Caviar, chateaubriand, and champagne are neither frugal nor simple and are not necessary to meet our natural needs. Beyond the simple diet necessary for relief of pain and for health, the chief natural pleasures are philosophy and friendship, which have a maximum of pleasure and a minimum of pain, and their pleasure persists over long periods of time. Furthermore, the necessary natural things, being simple and frugal, are easy to come by, while the unnecessary things are hard to come by.

In order to support the view that people could in fact determine, freely choose, their own pleasures, Epicurus had to provide some break in the hard mechanism of the atomists' physics, which he had found otherwise to his liking. He thus came to posit the existence of some autonomous atoms capable of spontaneous swerving motions that we experience as freedom of thought, of choice, and of self-determination.

The chief Roman champion of Epicurus' views was Lucretius, author or one of the great philosophical poems of history, *On the Nature of Things*, but he left the view unchanged, and we, therefore, urge the reading of the poem as a delightful poetic experience as well as an excellent statement of the views of both the hedonists and the atomists. (See LITERATURE.)

It is important to notice that the life style recommended and practiced by Epicurus was quite the opposite of that which bears his name in the modern world, where we regard as Epicurean one who lives a life of sensate

indulgence, luxury, and license. It is easy to see in the views of the hedonists, however, the justification for and the expression of much of the sensate living in the fourth century B.C. and later. It is also easy to see the chief difference between the classic rationalism of the Greeks and the later Roman Stoics (where reason was a cosmic force and determiner of the structure of reality and therefore the determiner of values) and hedonism (where the only function of reason was to judge between pleasures).

The chief difficulty in Epicureanism is it is difficult to prove that the commonly approved virtues which Epicurus recommended do in fact always yield more pleasure than pain or create a psychological state of tranquillity. The view leaves it quite open also for us to hold that injustice to others yields us more pleasure than pain and is therefore right for us, that irresponsibility and the pain and harm it brings to others is more pleasurable than painful to us and therefore right for us. In this view it is difficult to see any virtue in Socrates' accepting death rather than denying the integrity of his mind and soul, or to see that courage is better than cowardice, and honor better than dishonor, and love better than hate.

Yet it is important to observe somewhat in Epicurus' defense that his philosophy is a sort of individual salvation philosophy which was a reaction to, and a solution for, the individual living in the degenerate cultural conditions of the day. The day of the city-state, where most of life was fairly simple and direct and where men could still feel they had some control over their lives and fortunes and over the society in which they lived, was pretty much gone. Anyway, the conditions even there had been rather degenerate. In an empire, people obviously did not have much control over their own destinies or over their environment. It seemed not unreasonable, then, to act on the principle that the best thing people could do for themselves, and the best offering people could make to their society, was to live a life of intelligent tranquillity.

One of the chief limitations of the view lies in the fact that the hedonist tries to make sense out of views like Epicurus' by ignoring or openly denying the proper distinction between pleasure and the intellectual-moral-spiritual satisfactions and feelings of approval involved in having done one's duty even though painful, or in having done what was noble rather than ignoble, even though that, too, might shut out much pleasure. But it is generally held in philosophy that an important and definitive distinction must be made and maintained here, and that pleasure commonly means the pleasures of the body and its sensory and emotive life, and that this is in fact what Epicurus held; that even when he talked about the pleasures of philosophy and friendship, he was talking about the pleasure they yielded to the individual and not about the inherent value in friendship and philosophy per se.

Stoicism

After the Epicureans, the Stoics were the next great descendents of the Aristotelian view. The Stoics were so called because the founder of

the school, Zeno (c. 336-c. 264 B.C.), conducted his school in an open colonnade or porch, a *stoa*. Their theories of knowledge and of physics made no contribution to the cause of philosophy and science, and so we will go directly to their views in ethics, for which they are famous.

The highest good for any creature, they thought, lies in its acting in accordance with its nature, and such action leads to happiness. They shared the view then common in the Greek world that there is some objective reality called "nature," and that nature acts in regular, orderly ways which can be discovered by human reason. The life of human beings also may be, and broadly speaking is, ordered by reason, and because we know in human experience that reason is the ordering power, and that the order of nature is intelligible to the human mind, it is not unreasonable to believe that the order in nature is also ordered by a cosmic intelligence, most often called Logos, Reason, or Providence.

This ordering of nature and human life suggested naturally that if there is knowledge of moral values, and if moral values constitute the order of culture, then they too must be of the nature of reason and not purely conventions. The problem then was to determine what values were by nature and therefore by reason, for these would be established, constant and universal.

The answer seemed close at hand. If reason is what orders human life, what orders the regularities of nature, and what discerns these orders, then morality in accordance with nature--especially the nature of human beings--must be morality determined by reason. This determination must also be made in such a way that reason discerns what is universal in human values and what is essential in human nature rather than what is merely conventional. And the essential nature of human beings as distinct from other creatures is the kind and degree of their reason, so that for human beings to act in accordance with their nature is for them to act in accordance with this rationality. Hence, the moral life is the rational life.

The natural, then, is the norm for truth and right, and the natural for human beings as for nature is the rational. This is not a description of what people's values are--admittedly they often do not conform to reason but only to convention or to their own impulses or appetites--but of what people's values ought to be to conform to their nature and thus lead to happiness.

This view might indeed have been suggested to the early Stoics by the need for a worldwide ethic for the administration of the empire, but it is more likely that it came from the philosophical commitment to reason as the key to the order of all things. In any case, it certainly contributed to the administration of the Roman Empire by making the distinction between the local conventional laws, customs, and morals, and the universal rules necessary if imperial rule and hence justice were to be consistent.

It is also important to remember that this same idea carried over into

Christian theology and thus into the Church and the Holy Roman Empire, where the objective order of right and wrong was believed to be revealed from God by the Logos incarnate in Christ and continued in the Apostles and in the Church, and thus binding on all people. It survives in our own day, even contrary to our academic insistence on the relativity and conditioned nature of all our values, when we insist on an equal justice for all alike, when we judge a Nazi-type morality as being in violation of unalienable human rights, and when we insist that such rights are universally human and not just American.

This central idea of all things being ordered by a cosmic Reason (Logos) in which human reason participates led to the Stoic idea of duty in a sense strongly upheld by Socrates. In this context, duty is the obligation to live the life dictated by reason rather than that dictated by feeling, as the hedonists claimed. It is, therefore, anti-hedonistic.

Furthermore, because all things, including our private fortunes--good and bad--are ordered by the Logos, then reason demands that it is our duty to accept our fortunes without feeling, that is, with apathy. God, in fact, orders misfortune so that the soul can be tested and can develop its inner strength and character. Hardship, therefore, is to be prized, as a good soldier is proud to be chosen for a difficult and hazardous assignment. The gods love best those whom they test the hardest.

The concept of apathy is very important in Stoic thought. It is a permanent state of soul to be desired and finally achieved as the true condition of happiness. This apathy, we must point out, has to do with feelings, as the word indicates: *a-pathos*, "no feeling." If my fortunes are good, then I must not be too elated about it nor become emotionally involved in it but rather deal with it rationally. If my fortunes are bad, I must not be depressed or resentful but deal with that rationally too. But apathy means emotional indifference, not rational indifference. One must be strongly committed to the rational and against the irrational. In all things the state of the mind in equanimity was the beginning and the end. The achievement of this apathy called for a great deal of training, self-denial, and self-discipline, from which come our expressions "the Stoic life" and "the Stoic virtues."

Epictetus (c. A.D. 60-120), one of the more prominent Stoics, gave the Stoic view of the Logos (Reason) immanent in nature a distinctly religious emphasis, often speaking of it as God and of a human being as a "fragment torn from God."

Marcus Aurelius, the last of the great Stoics (A.D. 121-180), has been called "the last great product of the classical mind." He is included here especially because he gave a much more social and universal emphasis to Stoicism than Epictetus did, though by force of circumstance, he was more emperor than philosopher.

The universe for Aurelius, as for all Stoics, is a divine Order: "One living Being, possessed of a single soul [Logos] . . . ." and that soul is in every person. Social responsibility he considered in the order of

things. "All that is rational is akin, and it is man's nature to care for all men." ". . . how strong the kinship between man and mankind, for it is a community, not of corpuscles . . . but of intelligences." He summed up the Stoic practices well when he wrote:

> *Every hour make up thy mind sturdily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast in hand with scrupulous and unaffected dignity and love of thy kind and independence and justice; and to give thyself rest from all other impressions.*

The Stoic philosophy obviously had widespread influence in the Roman Empire, some of its illustrious emperors being devoted Stoics. It was also a strong influence in the life of the culture. It impregnated something of the spirit of respect for every person throughout the empire with its doctrine of human brotherhood based on the idea of the universal, immanent Logos making all people "morsels" or "fragments" of God. In this vein it certainly contributed to the development of the ideal of all actual law in its concept of "natural law," law based on nature, law for all people, not just for Romans. Its concept of duty as the obligation to live in accordance with natural reason and to endure all things within that duty without complaint in hardship and misfortune, and without conceit in success or good fortune, certainly contributed much to the nobility that was part of the Roman character, even though it may never have been perfectly realized, and many times, perhaps always to some degree, celebrated in its breach, in much the same way that Christianity or the democratic ideal have both served and failed in Western civilization.

Neo-Platonism

Stoicism had obviously shared in and was dominated by the classic naturalism of the Hellenistic culture. But at the same time it had developed the classic naturalism of the Greeks into a kind of naturalistic theism and had taken on a religious fervor and devotion. The natural law of the older materialists and of Aristotle's God as self-contemplating mind and pure form had been transformed into a cosmic Reason actively directing the world and the affairs of people. It was a philosophy which helped to give strength, dignity, and universal concern to much of Roman law and culture, but at the same time to give people a dimension of faith in the ultimate stability of things while they watched the slow, relentless disintegration and decay of the empire. If faith in humanity and human institutions, one of the great contributions of the classic period, was badly shaken, faith in a transcendent order of a directing Logos was still possible, and even necessary. It provided for "natural" humanity what the mystery cults (Mithraism, Isis and Osiris, Cybele and Attis, and the rest) had provided for religious humanity--a transcendental order by which and in which human life was treasured.

But after Marcus Aurelius there was no great Stoic to suit the times of accelerated decline in the third century, and, in any case, the mystery cults had won the popular attention. Most potent of all the competing forces in the third century was the rising power of a Christianity which,